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CO~URT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH

VERA M. STOUT,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
Case No.
WASHINGTON FIRE AND MARINE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a
corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.

9873

RES.PONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to recover for the value of unscheduled personal property due to destruction by
fire under a policy of insurance issued by the
defendant.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial Judge granted a Summary Judgment
in favor of plaintiff. The parties submitted to the
court the question of whether the defendant was
obligated under the terms of the policy to pay the
value of the destroyed unscheduled personal property.
The question was submitted upon a Stipulation of
Facts and Briefs. Plaintiff-Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment by the Trial Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff lives at 842 East 4500 South Street
in Salt Lake City, Utah. The lot on which her home
and other buildings are located is approximately 92
feet wide and 471 feet deep. The building used as the
home is located towards the front of the lot. Approximately 25 feet behind the home was the building
that was destroyed by fire.
On August 2, 1961, the building situated to the
rear of· plaintiff's home was completely destroyed
by fire, including all of the contents therein. This
building was used by the plaintiff as a tire recapping
shop and the plaintiff also used a part of the building
as a storage shed in which she kept the unscheduled
personal property that was destroyed in the fire and
2
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for which she. seeks to recover the value of said
property.
The sole issue of law to be determined herein is
whether the parties meant by the word "premises"
as used in the policy of insurance, the lot and all of
the buildings thereon or whether the word "premises"
should be defined to mean only the building used
as a dwelling.
ARGUMENT
PoiNT

I

THE MEANING AND INTENT OF THE
WORD "PREMISES" AS USED IN THE
POLICY OF INSURANCE SHOULD, IF POSSIBLE, BE DETERMINED FROM THE POLICY
ITSELF.
Any doubts or uncertainties as to the effect of the
policy of insurance or to its meaning are to be construed so as to resolve said doubts or uncertainties
against the defendant in as much as that company
prepared and issued the policy. Commercial Credit
Corporation vs. Premier Insurance Company, 12
Utah 2d 321.
The policy of insurance under general conditions
defines the word "premises" as follows:
3
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"The unqualified word "premises" means the
premises described in the declaration including grounds, garages, stables and other out
buildings incidental thereto and private approaches thereto."
In attempting to determine the meaning and scope
of the word "premises," all of the facts and the nature
of the claim should be given consideration. For
example a building on the premises used as a business
would not be incidental to the use of the property as
a dwelling. However, a part of that same building
used for storage of household effects and property of
a personal nature would be incidental to the use of
the property as a dwelling. Therefore, there is no
question but what a claim for damage to the building
as an appurtenant structure would not be covered.
There is no attempt in this case to make any claim
for damage to the building. The claim is for personal
property stored in the building. It also must be
remembered that the personal property was not
property used in the business but property incidental
to a dwelling, such as gardening equipment, camping
equipment, outdoor furniture, bicycles, equipment
for horse back riding, etc. The appellant seems to
be taking the position that the law in this case should
be the same as if a claim were made for the damage
to the building used as a business. The cases cited
in Appelant's Brief are to this effect.
4
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The appellant admits that the tire recapping
building was on the premises, (page 5 and 6 of his
Brief), but attempts to avoid liability by quoting the
policy as follows:
"The described building is not seasonal and no
business pursuits are conducted at the premises
thereof, exceptions if any. (no exceptions
noted).''
However, it must be remembered that the insurance
agent of the insurer, or the insurer, prepared and
filled out the policy. Further, the same insurance
agent wrote a policy of insurance on the tire recapping shop but did not place said insurance with this
company.
It was never intended by the insured that
premises should refer only to the building used as a
dwelling. The policy provides under Perils Insured
Against in reference to wind storm or hail "personal
property kept in building ( s)" using the word buildings in the plural form. The plural form of "buildings" is used in Section 5 in two different places
referring to damage caused to personal property by
steam or hot water heating systems. The plural form
is again used in regards to Section 12, Falling Objects.
Excluding loss to personal property by falling objects
unless the buildings containing the property shall
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first sustain damage. The plural form "building(s)"
is used in Section 13, Section 14, Section 15, Section
16, and Section 17. It is to be noted that Section t 4
provideds for coverage for outdoor equipment as a
direct result of the collapse of a building. Under
extensions of coverage, Section 3, Consequential Loss,
the policy provides for coverage to unscheduled personal property while contained in a building at the
described location. There is no indication that the
building must be a dwelling. Under "Special Limits
of Liability," Section 1, provides for a loss deductable
of $50.00 to personal property "in the open." Section
2 is identical. Section 3 provides that "this company
shall not be liable in any one loss with respect to the
following named property: (E) for more than
$500.00 on water craft including their trailers
whether licensed or not, furnishings, equipment and
outboard motors, nor for any loss by wind storm or
hail to such property not inside fully enclosed buildings. (Except row boats and canoes on the premises.)"
It is to be noted that row boats and canoes on the
premises are fully covered without the limitation of
$500.00.
From the foregoing it is obvious that the insured
meant to insure all of the personal property of the
insured while on the total area of the lot or in any
one of the buildings located on the lot. There are
6
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items of personal property specifically covered that
are not reasonably kept in the dwelling, such as the
outdoor equipment specifically mentioned in Section
14, the water craft including their trailers and row
boats and canoes.
One can well imagine appellant's dilemma in the
present case. It is difficult to sustain the argument
that the tire recapping shop was not on the premises
in view of the definition of "premises" in the policy.
The other alternative for the appellant is to argue
that the personal property is not covered if stored in
a place where business is conducted. The appellant
has tried to solve this dilemma by arguing that if a
building is used for one purpose, such as a garage, it
·would be on the premises, but if converted to a
business use it would not be on the premises. This
is illogical and it is submitted that if a building is on
the premises for one purpose it is also on the premises
for any other purpose.
This policy of insurance is in two sections. Section 1 refers to coverage on the dwelling, appurtenant
private structures, unscheduled personal property
and additional living expense. Section 2 coverage includes comprehensive personal liability, medical payments, and physical damage to property of others.
Under the section on Provisions Applicable to Section
7
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2 coverage, the policy very clearly excludes coverage
from business property. The policy then further
describes business property as property on which the
business is conducted.
The above exclusion refers only to coverage for
comprehensive personal liability and does not apply
to Section 1 coverage of the policy which is unscheduled personal property and it is submitted that
if the insurer had intended to exclude personal property from coverage while located on business property
he would have done so. There is nothing in the policy
in regards to unscheduled personal property that excludes coverage for said property while located on
business property.
In view of the great detail with which all of the
exclusions in the policy are spelled out (there are
perhaps a hundred exclusions in regards to coverage
on unscheduled personal property), it seems incredible that the insurer would have entirely overlooked
or omitted such a substantial exclusion from the
policy if it had intended that there should be no
coverage on unscheduled personal property if located
on business property. Huber and Rollin Construction
Company v. City of South Salt Lake, 7 Utah 2d 273.
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PoiNT

II

THE WORD "PREMISES" SHOULD BE
GIVEN ITS USUAL OR NORMAL MEANING.
In determining the intent of the policy the test
to be applied is would the meaning be plain to a
person of ordinary intelligence and understanding
viewing the matter fairly and reasonably in accordance with the usual and natural meaning of the words
and in the light of the existing circumstances including the purposes of the policy. Auto Lease Company
vs. Central Mutual Insurance Company, 7 Utah 2d
336.
The wording of the policy in regards to unscheduled personal property states:
"On premises this policy covers unscheduled
personal property usual or incidental to the
occupancy of the premises or dwelling, owned,
worn or used by an insured while on the
premises.''
Premises is defined in Websters dictionary as
follows:
"The property conveyed in a deed; hence
in general, a piece of land or of real estate;
sometimes, especially in fire insurance papers,
a building or buildings on land." Websters

9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

New International Dictionary, Second Edition,
1946.
This Mississippi Supreme Court has defined the
word "premises" as follows:
"The word "premises" has varying meanings,
usually determined by the context, and when
used with respect to property means land,
tenaments and appurtenancies." Rignall vs.
State, 98 So. 444, 134 Miss. 169.
An Oklahoma case states the following:
"House, home or premises includes the curtilage surrounding a dwelling home, the area
of land surrounding a house and actually or
by legal construction forming one enclosure
with it." Ratzell vs. State Okl., 228 P 166.
Under a Will giving a wife six months to vacate
the premises, it was held premises to mean, "a
distinct portion. of real estate, land or lands, land with
its appurtenances as buildings,-a building and its
adjucts." Ruble vs. Ruble, Texas, 264, S. W. 1018.
The word "premises when used with reference to
conveyances "in common parlance is used to signify
lands with their appurtenances." F. F. Proctor Troy
Properties Co. vs. Dugan Store 181 N.Y. S. 786.
Where lease is of premise, "premises" generally
10
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means land and buildings thereon. Bachenheiner vs.
Plam Spring Management Corp., 116 C. A. 2d 580,
254 P2d 153.
In an action on a fire insurance policy covering
a lumber yard and its contents, wherein there was
number of buildings and piles of stock, all within a
common enclosure, and also a lot across the street
disconnected from the main yard, the main yard,
with the property therein was held to be the premises,
and the lot across the street held to be separate
premises. Mangold vs. American Insurance Company
of Newark. 99 Neb. 656, 157 N. W. 632.
In a suit on a fire insurance policy, which defendant alleged insured has breached by failing to
keep a set of books containing a record of the property
on the premises, held, insured did keep requisite
books, "premises includes not only buildings, but
land upon which they are situate." Merchants and
Manufactures Lloyds Insurance Exchange vs. Southern Trading Company of Texas, Texas, 204 S. W. 352.
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the decision in
this case must be determined from a careful examination of the policy. Any doubts as to the meaning of
the policy should be resolved against the insurer and
the purpose of the policy should be considered. The
words used in the policy should be given their usual
or natural meaning.
An examination of the policy will conclusively
show that personal property was intended to be
covered while on the premises. Further, "premises"
was intended to include the total area of the lot and
all the buildings thereon. The natural and normal
meaning of "premises" is an enclosure or unit of
property and all the buildings thereon. The policy
provides for coverage to outdoor equipment, boats
and trailers while on the premises. Obviously, the
insurer did not intend to limit coverage to these
items while in the dwelling only.
The fact that the destroyed personal property was
kept in a place of business is immaterial as long as
the place of business is on the premises. There is no
exclusion on personal property because it is stored in
a place of business. Part of the policy, not applicable
to personal property, provides for an exclusion in re12
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gards to a part of the premises on which a business
is conducted. It is therefore reasonable to assume
that if the insurer had intended to exclude coverage
on personal property stored in a place of business
he would have done so.
Respectfully submitted,

BARTON AND KLEMM
Attorneys for Respondent
304 El Paso N atl. Gas Bldg.
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
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